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ABSTRACT
In the watermark detection scenario, also known as zero-bit
watermarking, a watermark, carrying no hidden message, is
inserted in content. The watermark detector checks for the
presence of this particular weak signal in content. The ar-
ticle looks at this problem from a classical detection theory
point of view, but with side information enabled at the em-
bedding side: the watermark signal is a function of the host
content. Our study is twofold. The first issue is to design
the best embedding function for a given detection function
(a Neyman-Pearson detector structure is assumed). The sec-
ond issue is to find the best detection function for a given
embedding function. This yields two conditions, which are
mixed into one ‘fundamental’ partial differential equation.
Solutions of this fundamental equation are heavily depen-
dent on the probability distribution function of the host sig-
nals. This conference paper is an extract of [7], where we
only look at white gaussian hosts. This gives birth to poly-
nomials solutions known as Hermite polynomial, whose ex-
tension is the JANIS watermarking scheme, invented heuris-
tically some years ago.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Watermarking, Detection theory, Pitman Noether theorem
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past six years, side-informed embedding strategies
have been shown to greatly improve watermark decoding.
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They exploit knowledge of the host signal during the con-
struction of the watermark signal. The theory underlying
these side-informed schemes was presented in the famous
paper “Writing on Dirty paper” by M. Costa in 1983. Our
work gives some theoretical aspects of the achievable perfor-
mances when using side-information at the embedding side
but for the watermark detection problem (a.k.a. zero-bit
watermarking [4, Sect. 2.2.3]). This surprisingly received
almost no study compared to the issue of watermark decod-
ing, although it is perceived as a non trivial problem [11].
The trade-off between payload of the hidden message and
robustness is a well known fact in watermarking. The main
rationale for zero-bit watermarking is that the maximum ro-
bustness that a watermarking primitive can inherently offer,
is expected as the payload is reduced to the minimum.
Some copy protection platforms [1] use watermarks as
flags whose presence warns compliant devices that the piece
of content they are dealing with, is a copyrighted material.
Content access and copy protection are tackled by crypto-
graphic primitives. Watermarking just prevents the ‘analog
hole’ [16, 6, 9]. Therefore, zero-bit watermarking is sufficient
in this application.
Copyright protection is the most famous application of
watermarking. However, hiding the name of the author in
his Work is just a fact having no legal value. In Europe, the
author must be first a member of an author society, then he
registers his Work. The only legal proof is to give evidence
that the suspicious image is indeed a version of a Work duly
registered in an author society’s database. Consequently,
this is a yes/no question, which can be solved by detecting
the presence or absence of a watermark previously embedded
by an author society. Here again, zero-bit watermarking is
sufficient for this application.
The attacker obviously knows which content is water-
marked. In the copy protection application, for instance,
there is no point in attacking a personal video which is a
free content.
2. STRATEGY AND NOTATION
Our goal is not to derive an accurate statistical model of
the host signal as done in prior works. On contrary, a very
basic assumption, ie. white gaussian distribution, is consid-
ered in order to stress the major role of side information at
the embedding side.
2.1 Embedding side
The embedder transforms an original host signal s into a
watermarked content y = f(s) = s + x. The host signal or
channel state s is a vector of n components of the original
content, modeled as random variables. The notational key
of the article is to decompose the watermark signal x as a
unit power vector w and an amplitude θ.
f(s) = s+ x = s+ θw(s). (1)
w(.) is a smooth function from Rn to Rn, with the constraint
E{‖w(s)‖2} = n (E{.} denotes the expectation). It is a
kind of direction pointing to an acceptance region of Rn,
towards which the host signal should be pushed. The scalar
θ controls the gain or amplitude of the watermark signal.
In practice, host contents might bear different watermark
power depending on their individual masking property. This
change might even occur within a content, such that we
should resort to a vector θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) gathering positive
and small gains affecting each sample. In this case, the
developments given in the sequel are still possible with a
vectorial notation. Yet, for simplicity’s sake, we assume
that θ is taken as the average gain of θ.
Both parts of the watermark signal depends on the host
content, either through side information, either for some per-
ceptual reasons. Unfortunately, in blind schemes, side infor-
mation is not made available at the detection side. More-
over, we wish to maintain a low detector’s complexity; hence,
no human visual or auditive system can recreate an estimate
of θ. Another point is that strong attacks certainly spoil this
estimation, and no study have been done on the robustness
of the detector with respect to this parameter. In our strat-
egy, the detector just knows that the watermark amplitude
is positive and small. We believe this model allows a great
flexibility which eases practical implementations of highly
robust watermarking schemes.
2.2 Detection side
Upon receipt of signal r, the detector makes a binary de-
cision: d = 1 (d = 0) means that, according to the detector,
the piece of content under scrutiny is watermarked (resp. it
has not been watermarked). There are two hypotheses: Un-
der hypothesis H0, the detector receives an original content
r = r0 = s (see end of the introduction for justifications),
whereas under hypothesis H1, the detector receives a water-
marked and possibly attacked content r = r1. Probability
of false alarm Pfa and power of the test Pp are given by
Pfa = Pr{d = 1|H0} ; Pp = Pr{d = 1|H1}. (2)
In zero-bit watermarking, no symbol is transmitted. Our
problem is then fundamentally different from the communi-
cation of one bit because, under hypothesis H0, no process-
ing is applied and s, given by Nature, is directly sent to the
detector.
We assume the detector has the structure of a Neyman-
Pearson test. First, it applies a detection function t(r) map-
ping from Rn to R. Then, this scalar is compared to a
threshold τ : d = 1 if t(r) > τ , 0 else. The threshold is
given by the constraint of a significance level α such that
Pfa = E{(t(r) > τ)|H0} ≤ α. Moreover, we assume with-
out loss of generality, that, under hypothesis H0, t(r) is a
centered random variable with unit variance:
E{t(r)|H0} = 0, Var{t(r)|H0} = 1 (3)
If not the case, it is easy to built the test t˜(r) = (t(r) −
E{t(r)|H0})/
p
Var{t(r)|H0}.
2.3 Pitman Noether efficacy
In this article, the tests are compared asymptotically for
n → +∞. The Pitman-Noether theorem indicates that the
best test has the higher efficacy η (or efficiency per sample),
whose general definition is given, for instance, in [15, Sect.
III.C.3]. In our case it simply reads:
η = n−1
„
∂
∂θ
E{t(r)|H1}
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
«2
. (4)
The proof of this theorem is based on an asymptotic study
where the alternative hypothesis H1 has a vanishing param-
eter θn = kn
−2, with k a positive constant and t(r)−E{t(r)}
is assumed, as n→∞, to be normal distributed with mean
0 and variance 1, both under H1 and under H0. These as-
sumptions brings important restriction to our study.
The original theorem compares two detection functions,
whereas we use it to compare two watermarking schemes
composed each of two functions: embedding and detection.
The methodology remains however the same.
3. DETECTION OFWEAK SIGNAL
DEPENDENT ON SIDE INFORMATION
The goal of this section is to give the expressions for best
detector and best embedding function. We mean ‘best’ in
the sense of the Pitman Noether theorem, ie. such as they
maximized the efficacy. This section doesn’t consider any
attack.
3.1 Best detector for a given embedding
In this subsection, embedding function w is fixed. A well
known corollary of the Pitman Noether theorem [15, Sect.
III.C.3] states that the Locally Most Powerful test in θ = 0
is asymptotically the best. A Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
gives:
∂
∂θ
E{t(r)|H1}
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
=
Z
Rn
t(r)
∂
∂θ
p(r|H1)
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
dv
≤
p
Var{t(r)|H0}
q
E{t20(r)|H0}
=
q
E{t20(r)|H0},
with equality for the LMP test:
t(r) = ktt0(r) = kt
1
p(r|H0)
∂p(r|H1)
∂θ
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
, (5)
where kt a positive constant whose role is explained below.
The use of the LMP with θ = 0 is reinforced in practice by
the fact the watermark power is very weak compared to the
host power.
When there is no attack, p(r|H0) = pS(r) and p(r|H1) =
pY(r). We assume that s ∼ N (0, σ2SI) and that there exists
θ¯ > 0, such that function f(s) is invertible at least when
0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯: s = f−1(y). This allows to write pY(r) =
pS(f
−1(r))|Jf−1(r)|, with the last term being the determi-
nant of the Jacobian matrix of f−1 taken at (r, θ). Devel-
oping this last equation, we finally get this expression:
t(r) = ktσ
−2
S r
T
w(r)− ktdiv(w(r)). (6)
The first term corresponds to the classical linear correlation
based test (except that in our case the watermark signal is
not fixed), whereas the second term is not null whenever
side information is enabled at the embedding side.
One can show [7] that this detection function is centered
under hypothesis H0, as required in subsection 2.2, pro-
vided E{‖w(s)‖2|H0} < +∞. The constant kt enforces that
Var{t(r)|H0} = 1:
kt =
 Z
Rn
1
p(r|H0)
»
∂p(r|H1)
∂θ
–2
θ=0
dv
!−1/2
. (7)
However, the asymptotic gaussianity is not granted in gen-
eral. It has to be checked for each particular case.
Finally, the efficiency per element for such tests reads:
η = n−1k−2t . (8)
3.2 Best embedding for a given detection
The detection function t being fixed (t(s) is assumed to
be centered, unit variance random variable under H0 and
asymptotically gaussian distributed), we write:
∂
∂θ
E{t(r)|H1}
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
= E

∂
∂θ
t(s+ θw(s))
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
ﬀ
(9)
= E{w(s)T∇t(s)}. (10)
It appears that, for a given t, it is important to let w(s) ∝
∇t(s), ∀s ∈ Rn. The efficacy is then upper bounded by the
following Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
η ≤ n−1E{‖w(s)‖2}E{‖∇t(s)‖2} (11)
with equality when:
w(s) = kw∇t(s) ∀s ∈ Rn. (12)
where kw is a normalizing constant to achieve E{‖w(s)‖2} =
n:
kw =
p
n/E{‖∇t(s)‖2}. (13)
(11) and (13) give the efficacy for such tests:
η = nk−2w = E{‖∇t(s)‖2}. (14)
3.3 Synthesis
For the moment, we know how to design the best em-
bedding function for a given detection function, and how
to design the best detection function for a given embedding
function. Insert (12) in (6) yields a partial differential equa-
tion, that we loosely name ‘fundamental equation of zero-bit
watermarking’:
(ktkw)
−1t(r)− σ−2S rT∇t(r) +∇2t(r) = 0, (15)
∇2t(r) being the Laplacian of t(r). Hence, the best couple of
detection/embedding functions {t,w} is {t⋆, kw∇t⋆}, with
t⋆ a fundamental solution, ie. a solution of (15). Note that
(8) and (14) are still valid. Therefore, it is possible to build a
scheme of a given η (virtually, as high as possible), provided
(15) admits a solution with (kwkt)
−1 = η, which is also
asymptotically gaussian distributed.
4. FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTIONS
We are not able to find a general solution of the fundamen-
tal equation, even with the restriction to the white gaussian
case. The following gives some examples.
Table 1: Polynomial solutions of the scalar Gaussian
case s ∼ N (0, 1).
η w(s) t(r)
1 1 r
2 s −1+r
2
√
2
3 −1+s
2
√
2
−3r+r3√
6
4 −3s+s
3
√
6
3−6r2+r4
2
√
6
5 3−6s
2+s4
2
√
6
15r−10r3+r5
2
√
30
6 15s−10s
3+s5
2
√
30
−15+45r2−15r4+r6
12
√
5
7 −15+45s
2−15s4+s6
12
√
5
−105r+105r3−21r5+r7
12
√
35
4.1 The scalar case
The host samples are i.i.d. such that pS(s) =
Qn
i=1 pS(si).
Moreover, our strategy here is to maintain this statistical in-
dependence while embedding the watermark:
w(s) = (ǫ1w(s1), . . . , ǫnw(sn))
T , where ǫ is a secret vec-
tor, with for instance, ǫi = ±1∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (6) shows
that the detection function has the following form t(r) =Pn
i=1 ǫit(ri) which is asymptotically gaussian thanks to the
central limit theorem. (15) boils down to a scalar second-
order ordinary differential equation with non constant coef-
ficients:
ηt(r)− σ−2S rt′(r) + t′′(r) = 0. (16)
The solution is a linear combination of two ‘independent’
(ie. their Wronskian is not null) confluent hypergeometric
functions of the first kind taken in r2/2:
t(a)(r) = kt1 .1F1
„
−σ
2
Sη
2
,
1
2
,
r2
2σ2S
«
, (17)
t(b)(r) = kt2 .r.1F1
„
1− σ2Sη
2
,
3
2
,
r2
2σ2S
«
. (18)
If σ2Sη is an even integer, t
(a) is a polynomial function. If
σ2Sη is an odd integer, t
(b) is a polynomial function. A
much more elegant way to see this is to recognize this later
differential equation as the Hermite equation when η is a
positive integer and σ2S = 1. Therefore, if ησ
2
S = k ∈ N,
tk(r) = κkHk(r/σS), Hk being the Hermite polynomial of
order k. Another definition is given by the Rodrigues for-
mula:
Hk(x) = (−1)kex
2/2 ∂
k
∂xk
e−x
2/2. (19)
This family of polynomials is known to be orthogonal with a
weighting function1 exp(−r2/2). This implies that elements
of this polynomial family satisfies:
E{tk(r)tℓ(r)|H0} = δ(k − ℓ), (20)
δ being the Kronecker delta function.
Table 4.1 gives the expressions of the first elements of
this family and their associated embedding function. The
first line of this table is the well known direct spread spec-
trum scheme with a linear correlator, optimal detector in the
1This is the ‘probabilist’ definition of Hermite polynomials.
However, these polynomials take different form according to
the chosen standardization. For instance, κk = 1/
√
k! when
the coefficient of highest order of Hk is set to 1.
Gaussian i.i.d. case. The second line is known as the pro-
portional or multiplicative embedding, first proposed in [3,
Sect. 4.2] for perceptual reason. A higher efficacy is another
inherent advantage of proportional embedding. The remain-
ing lines of this table generalize this idea to new schemes (as
far as the author knows).
4.2 The vector case
4.1 uses the cartesian system where the embedding pro-
cesses in a sample wise manner. We generalize this idea to
block based watermarking scheme assuming there exists an
integer p dividing n so that Rn = Rp×Rp . . .×Rp and that
pS(s) =
Qn/p
i=1 p(s(i−1)p+1, . . . , s(i−1)p+p). If t
(p) is a solution
of the fundamental equation in Rp with a given efficacy,
then t(n)(r) =
p
p/n
Pn/p
i=1 t
(p)(r(i−1)p+1, . . . , r(i−1)p+p) is a
solution in Rn yielding the same efficacy. This realizes a sta-
tistically independent embedding in the sense that the block
of p watermark samples only depends on the same block of
p host samples. Parameter p must be fixed for all n to en-
sure the asymptotic gaussian distribution of the detection
function. The issue is now on finding solutions t(p). A usual
technique is the separation of variables method in a specific
orthogonal coordinate system [13].
4.3 Separation of variables
In the cartesian coordinate system, the separation of vari-
ables method considers a solution t(p)(r) =
Qp
i=1 tηi(ri),
where each tηi has to satisfy (16) with their own efficacy
ηi. The resulting efficacy of t
(p) is then η =
Pp
i=1 ηi. This
gives birth to an extension of the polynomial family which
is indeed based on the multivariate Hermite polynomials,
indexed by the p-uple k ∈ Np: Hk(r) =
Qp
i=1 Hki(ri). Two
different elements of this family are orthogonal in the sense
that E{tk(r)tℓ(r)} = δ(k−ℓ), even having the same efficacy:
|k|1 = |ℓ|1 (L1-norm).
This extension of the polynomial family is illustrated in
the following example. JANIS, a zero-bit watermarking
scheme invented heuristically some years ago [8, 5], is a block
based fundamental solution for white gaussian host. Its de-
tection function is the following one:
t(r) =
r
p
n
n/pX
i=1
pY
j=1
r(i−1)p+j
σS
. (21)
Note that rk appears only once in the detection function,
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It is easy to see that rT∇t(r) = pt(r)
and ∇2t(r) = 0. Thus, JANIS with order p is a solution
to (15) provided that ησ2S = p. This can be interpreted
as follows: this is a block based watermarking scheme built
on the p multivariate Hermite polynomial H(1,...,1). This
theoretical framework proves the optimality of the heuristic
JANIS scheme. Note that this result is also given by the
generalized Rodrigues formula:
t(r) = (−1)|k|1κk 1
pS(r)
∂k1 . . . ∂kp
∂rk11 . . . ∂r
kp
p
pS(r) (22)
Separation of variables can be done on another coordinate
system. The spherical coordinate system (ρ, θ1, . . . , θp−1) is
in general adapted to isotropic host distributions, ie. pS(s) =
f(ρ) with ρ = ‖s‖. In our case, we have: f(ρ) ∝ e−ρ2/σ2S .
For instance, we seek a function t(r) = t(ρ, θp−1) whose ex-
pression in the spherical coordinate system is U(ρ)V (θp−1).
Separating variables in (15) yields two equations:
KV + (n− 2) cot θV ′ + V ′′ = 0,
(ηρ2 −K)U + `(n− 1)ρ− ρ3σ2S´U ′ + ρ2U ′′ = 0,
with K ∈ R. The choice U(ρ) = ρ2 and V (θ) = p cos2 θ − 1
is a solution provided K = 2p and ησ2S = 2: t(ρ, θp−1) =
ktρ
2(p cos2 θp−1 − 1). This solution is interpreted as
t(r) = kt
“
(
√
prT ep)
2 − ‖r‖2
”
, (23)
i.e. the measure of robustness given in Cox et al. book [4,
Eq.(5.13)]: t(r) = cst defines a p-dimensional two-sheet hy-
perboloid. This acceptance region is closed to a one-sheet
hypercone, acceptance region of the well-known normalized
correlation [4], or a double-sheet hypercone, acceptance re-
gion of the squared normalized correlation [12]. Yet, nei-
ther the famous normalized correlation t(r) = rT .ep/‖r‖ =
cos θp−1, nor its squared version are fundamental solutions
for gaussian hosts. As a concluding remark, although the
spherical coordinate system seems to provide solutions quite
different than the polynomial family, it appears that the
later solution can be rewritten as a mixture of second order
Hermite polynomials: t(r) = kt
√
2(pH2(rp)−Ppi=1 H2(ri)).
4.4 Sparsity
Many possible coordinate systems allow a separation of
variables, but their investigation is out of scope in this paper.
However, we would like here to rediscover a famous principle
in watermarking. Suppose we know a solution t⋆ to the
scalar equation : η⋆t⋆(x)+L(x)t⋆′(x)+t⋆′′(x) = 0. We would
like to extend this scalar solution to higher space dimension
considering a solution in the form: t = t⋆ ◦ g, with g : Rn →
R a derivable function. Gradient and laplacian have the
following expressions:
∇t(r) = t⋆′(g(r))∇g(r), (24)
∇2t(r) = t⋆′′(g(r))‖∇g(r)‖2 + t⋆′(g(r))∇2g(r), (25)
and the fundamental equation becomes:
ηt⋆′(g(r))
„
− η
η⋆
L(g(r)) + σ−2S r
T∇g(r) +∇2g(r)
«
+ t⋆′′(g(r))
„
‖∇g(r)‖2 − η
η⋆
«
= 0 (26)
We restrict our analysis to a linear form, ie. a projection
g(r) = rTλ. Then, t is a fundamental solution with efficacy
η = η⋆‖λ‖2, provided we have:
L(rTλ) =
1
‖λ‖2σ2S
r
T
λ. (27)
L(x) is thus the score (ie. the ratio p′(x)/p(x)) associated
to N (0, ‖λ‖2σ2S), the distribution of rTλ. Consequently, we
discover here a possible extension of the polynomial family
to the vector case with fundamental solutions of the form
tk(r) = κkHk(r
T
λ/‖λ‖σS), (28)
whose efficacy is η = k/σ2S . However, asymptotic gaussian-
ity is not granted and a similar strategy as the block water-
marking above-mentioned should be use to regularise this
issue.
This kind of solutions illustrates the principle known as
sparsity or time sharing [14, Sect. 5.2 and 8.2], where the
watermark embedding is processed on the projection rTλ.
5. ATTACK NOISE
When there is an attack, the received signal under H1 is
r1 = a(y). The attack channel a is defined through a con-
ditional probability distribution pa(r1|y), whose associated
attack power is σ2a =
R R ‖r1 − y‖2pa(r1|y)pY(y)dydr1/n.
The parameters of the attack channel are unknown at the
detection side. We would like to keep the detection as simple
as possible so that the estimation of these parameters is not
tractable in this strategy. The performance of the detector
should slowly degrade with the strength of the attack for a
robust watermarking scheme.
The Pitman Noether might then become useless because
there is a disruption between the two hypothesis: H1 doesn’t
asymptotically converge to H0, due to the presence of the
attack channel only under H1.
We present here two ways to tackle this problem, changing
our framework in order to enforce the Pitman Noether the-
orem. A first idea is to restrict our analysis to a fixed WNR
(watermark to noise power ratio): θ2n/σ
2
a = g. The received
signal can be written as: r1 = s + θnw(s) + θn
√
gz˜, with
E{‖z˜‖2} = n. Therefore, the power of the difference signal
r1 − r0 asymptotically vanishes with θ2n. The second idea
considers attacks with fixed DNR (document -ie. host- to
noise power ratio) where signals are corrupted by the same
attack under both hypothesis as T. Liu and P. Moulin did
[10]. Yet, the targeted applications as described in our in-
troduction do not a priori motivate this possibility because
the attack of unprotected content are clearly unlikely. We
argue that a ‘soft’ attack lead on original pieces of content
yields regular content, in the sense that it still statistically
looks like a content. In other words, we restrict our study
to attack channels changing the value of the feature vectors,
but not modifying their inherent statistical structure.
Under both attack models, the fundamental equation ap-
pears to be statistically robust in the sense that it is not
modified by the presence of noise. However, this is only true
for very particular conditions as described in the sequel.
5.1 Fixed WNR attacks
This subsection only shows that the fundamental equation
remains unchanged when watermarked signals go through a
fixed WNR AWGN attack channel.
5.1.1 Best embedding for a given detection
As usual, we write:
∂
∂θ
E{t(r)|H1}
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
=
∂
∂θ
ESEZ˜t(s+ θw(s) + θ
√
gz˜)
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
= ES{w(s)T∇t(s) + EZ˜
√
gz˜T∇t(s)}
We assume z˜ is independent of s and centered, so that the
second term is null. We find back the same best embedder
as (12).
5.1.2 Best detection for a given embedding
The pdf of r1 = y +
√
gθz˜ is given by the following con-
volution:
pR1(r) =
Z
pY(u)p√gθZ˜(r− u)du, (29)
whose derivative is composed of two terms:
∂
∂θ
pR1(r)
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
=
Z
∂
∂θ
pY(u)
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
lim
θ→0
p√gθZ˜(r− u)du
+
Z
pS(u)
∂
∂θ
p√gθZ˜(r− u)
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
du (30)
We assume that z˜ is normal distributed, so that its limit
limθ→0 p√gθZ˜(r − u) is the Dirac distribution. Hence, the
first term is, as detailed in Sect. 3.1, the derivative of the
pdf without attack.
The second term is calculated being inspired by some
proofs of the De Bruijn’s identity (see [2, Th. 16.6.2]). It
corresponds to the derivative of the pdf of a(s) = s+
√
gθz˜
with respect to θ. In one hand, we have:
∂
∂θ
pa(S)(r) =
Z
pS(u)
„‖r− u‖2
gθ3
− n
θ
«
p√gθZ˜(r− u)du
(31)
On the other hand, it appears that:
∇2pa(S)(r) =
Z
pS(u)
„‖r− u‖2
g2θ4
− n
gθ2
«
p√gθZ˜(r− u)du
=
1
gθ
∂
∂θ
pa(S)(r).
Finally, the second term is null because:
∂
∂θ
pa(S)(r)
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
= lim
θ→0
gθ∇2pa(S)(r) = 0, (32)
and we find back the same best detection function as (6).
To conclude, neither the best embedding nor the best de-
tection have changed under the fixed WNR AWGN attack
channel. Hence, the fundamental equation still holds in this
framework.
5.2 Fixed DNR attacks
We consider a different framework where the hypothesis
are now: H0 : r0 = a(s) against H1 : r1 = a(s + θw(s)).
What is the impact on the detection and embedding func-
tions?
As already said, our analysis only holds for channel at-
tacks conserving the statistical structure of the host sig-
nal. The restrictions are as follows. For gaussian host s ∼
N (0, In), the attack is the SAWGN channel: a(s) = γ(s+z),
with z ∼ N (0, σ2ZIn) independent of s and γ = 1/
p
1 + σ2Z .
The attack is a Wiener filtering for this very simple case,
which maintains p(r|H0) as a normal distribution. The ex-
pression (6) of the best detection function given the embed-
ding function is thus not modified.
This is not the case for the best embedding function given
the detection function. For the class of attack channel con-
sidered in this paper, a(s) = γ(s + z), (9) is modified as
follows:
∂
∂θ
E{t(r)|H1}
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
= ESEZ
∂
∂θ
t(γ(s+ θw(s) + z))
˛˛˛
˛
θ=0
= γES{w(s)TEZ{∇t(γ(s+ z))}}(33)
This last equation shows that the best strategy at the em-
bedding side should set
w(s) ∝ EZ{∇t(γ(s+ z))}. (34)
This implies that the embedder knows the attack chan-
nel parameters. This counter attack may not be realis-
tic in general. However, there are some cases where the
counter attack (34) is surprisingly simple because it is in-
deed identical to the regular embedding strategy (12) what-
ever the parameters of the attack channel. This occurs
when t is such that EZ{∇t(γ(s + z))} = h(γ, σZ)∇t(s).
As a consequence, the fundamental equation (15) derived
in the no attack case, remains valid under these particular
attack cases. The efficiency per element is then equal to
η(γ, σZ) = γ
2h2(γ, σZ)η(1, 0).
For the Hermite polynomial family, we rewrite the Wiener
filtering denoting z˜ = σ−1Z z distributed as N (0, 1) and α =
arccos(γ). A not so familiar identity of the Hermite polyno-
mials is the following:
Hℓ−1 (cos(α)s+ sin(α)z˜) =Pℓ−1
k=0
“
ℓ−1
k
”
cosk(α) sinℓ−1−k(α)Hk(s)Hℓ−1−k(z˜).
EZ{t′ℓ(γ(s + z))} reduces to κℓℓγℓ−1Hℓ−1(s) = γℓ−1t′ℓ(s)
because EZ˜{Hk(z˜)} = δ(k). Consequently, the polynomial
family is a set of fundamental solutions for i.i.d. gaussian
hosts and SAWGN attacks with Wiener filtering, whose ef-
ficiency per element is given by η(γ, σZ) = ℓγ
2ℓ. Wiener
filtering means that γ = (1 + σ2Z)
−1/2. Two noticeable ex-
emptions are t1 and t2, whose efficiency follows the same rule
whatever the value of γ of the SAWGN channel. Last but
not least: the higher the ‘original’ efficiency η(1, 0) = ℓ, the
less robust is the scheme in the sense that η(γ, σZ)/η(1, 0) =
(1 + σ2Z)
−η(1,0) decreases faster with the strength of the at-
tack. We have found this feature in other watermarking
schemes [7].
The same analysis also holds for the extension of the poly-
nomial family to the vector case. For instance, JANIS is
a solution of the fundamental equation for i.i.d. gaussian
hosts and SAWGN attack, such that EZ{∇t(γ(s + z))} =
γp−1∇t(s). The Wiener filtering restriction is not necessary
as JANIS is based on first order Hermite polynomials. This
gives the following efficiency η(γ, σZ) = pγ
2p which follows
the same decreasing rule as the polynomial family.
6. CONCLUSION
Zero-bit watermarking pertains to test hypothesis. The
efficacy is a core notion in this field because of the Pit-
man Noether theorem asymptotically comparing test per-
formances. Working on the expression of the efficacy when
side information is enabled at the embedding side gives a
fundamental equation. This equation still holds when an
attack channel is considered with some very restrictive as-
sumptions. When focusing on white gaussian hosts, Hermite
polynomials form a class of solutions of the fundamental so-
lution. JANIS indeed appears to be a mixture of multivari-
ate low order Hermite polynomials. This shows that JANIS
is provably good in the sense that it is a solution of the
fundamental equation under SAWGN attacks.
Our future work is to see whether the generalized Ro-
drigues formula (22) can work with different probability dis-
tribution functions such as gaussian with covariant matrix
Rx 6= σ2XIn or exponential family.
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